Why Your Equipment Died Despite a 20 kA SPD
A complete worked reasoning chain — from "the ratings check out" to "the equipment was destroyed" — and which step was actually missed.
This piece walks through a typical scenario from start to finish. At each layer, the question is: and what is the next question?
The scenario
A manufacturing company, an automated production line, lightning protection retrofitted in 2024.
Configuration (on paper) - Incomer: Type 1, Iimp 50 kA·C, Uc 385 V - Workshop distribution panel: Type 2, In 40 kA, Uc 385 V, Up ≤ 1.5 kV - Equipment end: none - Earthing: site earth grid, measured 3.2 Ω
Failure: August 2026, during a thunderstorm, the line's main PLC power module was destroyed, the touchscreen went black, and the VFD reported an overvoltage fault. On inspection, the incomer Type 1 indicator was still green (normal) and the workshop Type 2 indicator was red (failed).
The obvious reading: the Type 2 did its job, sacrificed itself, and the equipment died anyway. Is that just how it is?
No. The equipment end had no Type 3 at all.
Follow-up one: what did the failed Type 2 actually protect?
The Type 2's Up was up to 1.5 kV. It limited the surge voltage to 1.5 kV — and that voltage arrived at the PLC's power input.
Question: is 1.5 kV a safe voltage?
Obviously not. Most industrial electronic equipment has input withstand voltages around 1 kV, and some only 500 V. At 1.5 kV the equipment is certainly damaged.
First conclusion: the Type 2's Up must satisfy Up ≤ 0.8 × equipment withstand voltage.
For this project: if the equipment withstand is 1 kV, then 0.8 × 1 kV = 800 V. The Type 2's 1.5 kV is nearly double that. The selection was non-compliant from the start — even on paper.
Follow-up two: why did the Type 2 fail?
A failed Type 2 means it absorbed more energy than it could withstand. Possible causes: - It carried direct strike current (the Type 1 was not far enough upstream, so strike current partly divided into the Type 2) - The Type 1 and Type 2 were too close together, unbalancing the energy distribution so the Type 2 took the energy the Type 1 should have taken - The Type 1 was under capacity
Follow-up three: did the Type 1 protect the Type 2?
Here lies a hidden problem. The Type 1's indicator was green — it had not failed.
But the Type 2 failed while the Type 1 survived. That means the Type 1 was not carrying the current it should have.
If the Type 1 were operating correctly and absorbing the bulk of the energy, the Type 2 would see a flattened residual and should not have failed. A Type 2 that fails while the Type 1 survives points to one explanation:
The Type 1 and Type 2 are too close together (in the same cabinet, or very near), so the stage-to-stage coupling is near zero. Energy distribution is severely unbalanced — most of the energy is taken by the downstream Type 2, and the Type 1 is effectively bypassed.
This matches item 4 in Installation Mistakes I Have Seen exactly.
Follow-up four: why is the Type 2's Up 1.5 kV?
A Type 2 with Uc = 385 V was selected. Its Up is roughly 3–4 × Uc for a pure GDT or high-energy MOV type, giving 1.5 kV.
But the project needed: equipment withstand 1 kV → Up ≤ 800 V → a combination-type device at Uc 275–320 V (Up ≈ 1.3 × Uc), or a lower voltage grade.
Conclusion: the selection traded "leave margin on Uc" against "keep Up low" as if they were opposites. They are not the same axis. To get a low Up you need a lower Uc grade with a combination structure — not a larger Uc.
Follow-up five: is 3.2 Ω of earthing resistance sufficient?
Assume the Type 1's In of 40 kA (8/20 µs) leaves 20 kA of residual current into a 3.2 Ω earth:
U_earth potential rise = 20 kA × 3.2 Ω = 64 kV
This looks absurd, and in reality it is far lower, because current distributes across a large grid and the high-frequency impedance exceeds the DC resistance. But the direction is unambiguous: 3.2 Ω is high in a lightning context.
If the potential difference between the equipment's signal/earth reference and the SPD's PE reaches several hundred volts, that is sufficient to damage a PLC's communication interfaces or analogue channels.
Follow-up six: what should the design have been?
Working backwards:
Step 1: establish the equipment withstand voltage Find the PLC power module specification, and note the input withstand voltage and surge immunity level (the IEC 61000-4-5 test level).
Step 2: set the Up for each stage - Final stage (Type 3, at the PLC power input): Up ≤ 0.8 × equipment withstand - Intermediate (Type 2): Up 30–50 V above the final stage - Primary (Type 1): Up 100–150 V above the intermediate - And every stage's Up must remain below what the equipment behind it can withstand
Step 3: separate the stages Type 1 and Type 2 in different cabinets or ≥ 5 m apart; Type 2 and Type 3 ≥ 2 m apart.
Step 4: improve earthing and equipotential bonding - Earthing resistance target ≤ 1–2 Ω, assessed for high-frequency impedance rather than DC value alone - Bond the equipment enclosure, cable trays, and PLC cabinet to the SPD's PE - Shorten the Type 3's leads to the PLC
Step 5: add signal-side protection The PLC's communication lines (PROFINET / Ethernet / RS485) running to the operator station need signal protection as well.
Review conclusion
Back to the original question: "the datasheet said 40 kA — why was the equipment still destroyed?"
Because 40 kA describes how much energy the device can absorb, while equipment survival is determined by the voltage actually appearing at the equipment terminals.
Between those two numbers sit four transformations: 1. Adequate Up grading between stages 2. Sensible energy distribution 3. Additional voltage introduced by the installation (lead inductance, spatial coupling, earth potential rise) 4. The equipment's own withstand margin
If any one of the four fails, 40 kA buys nothing.
This also answers the recurring question: why not simply trust the datasheet — because the datasheet contains none of these four transformations.
One action to take away
The next time you complete a selection, after checking the datasheet parameters, add one line of hand calculation:
Up(final stage) ≤ 0.8 × equipment withstand ?
Stage separation ≥ 30 V ?
Voltage introduced by lead inductance < stage separation ?
Two minutes of arithmetic can stop most design-stage errors.
Figures are used to illustrate the reasoning. Real projects must follow the equipment specifications and the current standards.
